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Abstract
Launceston, Tasmania’s second largest 
municipality, has been recognised as a flood-
prone area since the first major inundation 
was recorded in 1828. Following a one in forty 
year flood event in 1969, the areas susceptible 
to flooding were protected by a levee system 
which has been maintained and funded by the 
Launceston City Council (LCC) and the Tasmanian 
Government. In May 2007, the latest funding 
from all tiers of government was committed to 
levee maintenance. This article examines the 
development of Launceston’s flood levee and 
flood mitigation policies. It argues that while 
levee maintenance is an important part of flood 
management, the additional social, emergency 
management and planning and development 
policies that are currently being implemented will 
strengthen the policy makers’ responses in the 
event of a flood.
Launceston has been known to be susceptible to 
flooding since the first major flood was recorded in 
September 1828. This flood risk is primarily due to 
the location and topography of Launceston’s lower 
suburbs, Inveresk and Invermay. These suburbs are 
located at the confluence of the North Esk, South Esk 
and Tamar Rivers which are fed by a catchment system 
that covers 14 per cent of Tasmania (GHD 2006: 1; 
Launceston City Council 2009). In addition, Inveresk 
and Invermay were built on reclaimed swamp, which 
is part of a natural floodplain on the Tamar River 
Estuary. As this area developed from a work site for 
wharf workers to a settlement in the early 1900s, 
flood inundation was mitigated by the construction 
of small tidal levees. In 1960, a decision was made 
to build ten kilometres of earthen levees around the 
flood prone suburbs. However, many of these levees 
failed during construction as they were too heavy for 
the swamp land. These construction failures were 
augmented during the 1960s and 1970s by use of 
rigid piled concrete levees and temporary mud box 
levees, the latter which were to provide height without 
excessive weight in order to avoid sinking. However, 
the performance of these repairs is uncertain; the 
rigid concrete levees have since developed cavities 
underneath, allowing a degree of underflow; the 
temporary mud boxes have failed; and the remaining 
earthen levees have sunk and need to be lifted so as 
to prevent overflow. Recent engineering reports have 
concluded that the levee system is in dire need of 
repair as it would not protect the two suburbs in the 
event of a one in fifty year flood event. 
The minor flooding which frequently occurs in the 
Esk Rivers does not pose a significant danger for 
the community. However, history illustrates that 
Launceston has encountered several major floods 
which have caused substantial infrastructural damage 
and loss of life. Among these, the flood event which 
occurred from 4-6 April, 1929 was the most significant 
experienced during the century in North-East Tasmania 
(State Emergency Service 1990: 21). The LCC flood 
classification system identifies the 1929 flood as a one 
in one hundred year flood event – that is, there is a 
one per cent chance that a flood of or greater than 
the magnitude of the 1929 event will occur in a given 
year. In comparison, the levees protecting Inveresk and 
Invermay at the time of the 1929 flood were merely 
capable of withstanding a one in twenty year flood 
event. The impact of the 1929 flood was intensified 
by the growth of Invermay, which had evolved from 
a swampland with one road in the late 1800s to a 
thriving community. The 1929 flooding caused 22 
deaths, left approximately 4,500 people homeless, and 
1000 homes rendered in need of repair or rebuilding 
(Terry and Servant 2002: 30). The flood event created 
immense long term ramifications for Launceston. 
Industries outside the inundation area were crippled 
due to a week of absenteeism following the flood. 
Flood damage, including huge losses of stock, the 
destruction of railways, bridges, roads and the 
Duck Reach Power Station, had a huge impact upon 
Launceston’s economy. Two months afterward, ten per 
cent of the homes that had been inundated were still 
awaiting health certificates to be approved for usage 
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once more. It was some weeks after the flooding until 
the industrial and commercial workings of Launceston 
regained momentum and before the remaining 
refugees were permanently housed. Given these events, 
in conjunction with the subsequent development 
throughout Invermay since 1929, current policies have 
focused on reducing the consequences of such a dire 
flood event.
The summary of policies and decisions on local, state 
and federal levels that are briefly examined in this 
paper demonstrate the extensive policy making in 
this issue area. This paper is based on the research 
that was prepared for the Launceston Flood Research 
Initiative in which both authors were involved (Willis, 
Vogt, Natalier and Vince 2008). This Initiative had 
two elements. The first drew upon the perceptions of 
risk among flood-affected Launceston residents and 
preliminary findings were summarised in a recent 
article by Vogt, Willis and Vince (2008). This article 
comprises the second part of the Launceston Flood 
Research Initiative, focusing on the flood mitigation 
policies implemented as a response to this issue.
The levee issue and policy decisions 
In the wake of Launceston’s 1929 flood, the LCC 
and the Tasmanian government considered a range 
of flood mitigation measures. In December 1960, the 
Tasmanian government approved the construction of 
levees to replace existing earthen barriers to protect 
Inveresk and Invermay from future flood events. 
However, a number of failures apparent in the design, 
construction and the settlement of the foundations of 
the levees during the 1960s and 1970s led members 
of the LCC to see the levee system as fundamentally 
flawed (Launceston Flood Protection Board 1975; 
Parliament of Tasmania 2006). Temporary fixtures 
erected in the 1970s remain yet to be replaced. A 
report from engineering consultancy firm GHD in 
2006 stated that the LCC Flood Protection Scheme, 
including the levees surrounding Invermay, posed a 
significant risk of failure in the event of a one in fifty 
year flood (GHD 2006: iv). It is estimated that if the 
levees were to fail, 40 per cent of Invermay could be 
inundated with as much as one metre of water during 
high tide each day. In addition, the consequences of 
a flood event occurring today would be considerably 
worse than in 1929 due to further infrastructural, 
business and housing development. If a one in one 
hundred year flood were to occur today, it would 
have a devastating effect on Inveresk and Invermay, 
potentially causing damage to 78 commercial, 649 
residential and 194 industrial properties (Williams 
2007: 4). Further, it is likely that some of Launceston’s 
most prominent infrastructure, including Aurora 
Stadium, the Queen Victoria Museum and Art Gallery, 
and the University of Tasmania’s Inveresk Campus 
would incur flood related damage (Vogt, Willis and 
Vince 2008: 49). The need for evacuation and the 
closure of major roads would render a significant 
part of the city inaccessible with service interruptions 
preventing home occupation and commercial activity. 
The degeneration of the levee system over time, in 
conjunction with further development in flood-prone 
areas has left Launceston highly susceptible to flood 
events. Although this issue has been addressed in the 
past, it has only been since 1999 that a comprehensive 
policy solution has been initiated. 
The need to act upon Launceston’s flood risk sparked 
debate between the LCC, Tasmanian government and 
Tasmanian representatives in the Federal government 
as to who should fund the reconstruction of the 
levees. Although the Tasmanian government was 
financially responsible for levee maintenance, the cost 
of addressing these fundamental deficiencies was far 
greater than could be dealt with in the annual budget 
(Tasmanian Department of Premier and Cabinet 2007). 
This predicament led to the Tasmanian government 
and LCC signing a Partnership Agreement and forming 
a Flood Steering Committee in 1999 to reassess the 
cost of levee maintenance. The Committee was also 
responsible for developing long term land use planning 
strategies for the suburbs and investigating sustainable 
dredging of the Tamar River (Tasmanian Department of 
Premier and Cabinet 2007). 
Despite these good intentions, very little action 
occurred until 2003 when the Steering Committee 
released an expression of interest for a consultancy 
study to attain an educated judgment as to what 
actions should be undertaken. The chosen consultant 
was GHD, an engineering consultancy firm which 
was commissioned to undertake a social, economic, 
infrastructure and flooding risk assessment of 
Launceston’s low-lying suburbs (GHD 2006: 1). 
The GHD report confirmed the poor condition of 
Despite the flood risk, Invernay and Ineresk are considered by 
many to be areas offering suitable lifestyle choices.
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Launceston’s levee system, stating that there was a 
40 per cent chance of a flood causing more than 
$110 million damage in the next 50 years (GHD 
2006: iv). Consequently, GHD recommended a 
number of strategies which did not rely completely 
on levee focussed outcomes as had the previous State 
government’s solution. The recommendations included 
parts of the current levee system being either rebuilt 
or repaired, the revision of land use planning and 
development control policies in flood prone areas, and 
a major review of LCC flood response and management 
plans (GHD 2006: v).
In order to identify a flood mitigation strategy from 
the options suggested by GHD and an appropriate 
funding model, the Flood Steering Committee hired 
consultant Frontier Economics (Frontier Economics 
2006: iv). The consultant supported GHD’s findings to 
redevelop levees, planning controls and flood warning 
and evacuation procedures. Frontier suggested that the 
$30 million initial cost of the recommendations should 
be borne equally between the LCC, State and Federal 
government (Frontier Economics 2006: vi). Given 
that the project was entirely reliant on the acquisition 
of the Federal government’s portion of the funding, 
it played a pivotal role in bringing the flood issue to 
the fore (Tasmanian Government 2007a). Similarly, 
the State government’s contribution to the funding 
was conditional on the LCC and Federal Government 
committing similar costs. The Agreed Measures also 
stated that LCC and the State government were to 
prepare a submission to the Federal government 
seeking a commitment to their $10 million share of 
the funding (Tasmanian Government 2007a). Despite 
a minor readjustment in which the overall figure had 
to be expanded to $39 million to compensate for an 
increase in property values and the need to relocate 
Lindsay Street properties to build a levee wall, all three 
tiers of government had agreed to provide $13 million 
each in early 2007 (Williams 2007b; Aird 2007; 
Australia Parliament 2007).
Policy responses
After a period of negotiation between the members of 
the Steering Committee, a range of flood mitigation 
measures was agreed upon and released in April 
2007 (Launceston City Council 2007a). These 
Agreed Measures were designed to address relevant 
social issues, planning and development, emergency 
management coordination and levee reconstruction 
and maintenance. The LCC and the Tasmanian State 
government have since formulated a number of policy 
responses in order to reflect these measures.
Social issues
A distinct lack of flood risk awareness and emergency 
response strategies within the Invermay community 
necessitated the execution of social policies. The 
Agreed Measures stipulated that the LCC was to 
establish a public education strategy to increase 
public awareness of the flood risk in Invermay and 
Inveresk (Tasmanian Government 2007a). This led 
to the formation of the Council-enacted Launceston 
Flood Research Initiative in May 2007 which produced 
a report in February 2008 analysing community 
perspectives of flood risk. This report has served as 
a basis for the LCC’s public education strategy (Vogt 
and Brayford 2007). A pilot flood education strategy 
commenced in June 2007 where flood emergency 
plans designed by Invermay Primary School and 
Meander Primary School students were showcased 
in an exhibition held at the Queen Victoria Museum 
and Art Gallery (Midgley 2007; Launceston City 
Council 2008a). The public education strategy also 
included the distribution of Flood Preparation Kits to 
potentially affected households to inform residents of 
what they should do before, during and after a flood 
(Scott, 2009a).The analysis of other pertinent social 
issues, such as the dissemination of flood emergency 
information to key demographic groups such as elderly 
people and immigrants, have been addressed in the 
Launceston Flood Research Initiative’s report. 
Building and planning
In order to attend to the Agreed Measures that 
related to building and planning, a Planning Steering 
Committee was formed within the LCC in 2006. The 
aim of the building and planning measures was to 
prevent further development which would increase the 
consequences of a flood, with the long-term intention 
of converting land use to facilitate activities that incur 
a low level of flood damage (Tasmanian Government 
2007a). In order to execute building restrictions in 
Invermay, the Committee amended the Tasmanian 
Government’s Building Act 2000 in July 2006, which 
involved the adoption of a floor flood level of 3.4 
metres above sea level for the Inveresk and Invermay 
area (Launceston City Council 2007b). This flood floor 
level applied to the construction of all new residential 
buildings and the modification to any habitable 
floor area in the flood zone. In conjunction with the 
building restrictions, the Planning Steering Committee 
undertook a review of the LCC Planning Scheme in 
order to guide future land use and development and 
the management of natural environments up until 
2020 (Launceston City Council 2007c). The review 
led to the development of land classifications for 
flood-liable land and the prohibition of construction 
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between the levee system and the river (Community 
Development Initiatives Australia 2007). Further 
extensive revision to the Planning Scheme included 
the prohibition of new residential developments, new 
schools and aged care homes as well as the prohibition 
of any other development which would magnify the 
damage caused by a flood. 
In August 2008, LCC Aldermen voted to breach the 
Agreed Measures by easing these planning restrictions 
in order to permit the construction of housing units, 
education facilities and a cinema and bowling complex 
in Invermay (Williams 2008a). This demonstrates 
a frequently encountered challenge in developing 
flood mitigation measures for existing flood-prone 
communities, whereby investment in flood control 
works (such as levees) elicits a perceived reduction 
in risk and consequently stimulates floodplain 
development (Smith 1998: 232-3). Smith describes 
this as the ‘levee paradox’, whereby the intensification 
of development behind levees generates higher 
potential losses than that experienced before the 
construction of levees. Due to this inherent over-
reliance in the structural control of floodwaters, the 
levee paradox poses a continual challenge for effective 
flood mitigation. Fortunately in the case of Launceston, 
threats from the Federal and State government 
to withdraw their collective $26 million funding 
prevented the LCC from acting upon these planning 
scheme changes (Williams 2008b). The LCC has since 
rescinded its decision to ease planning restrictions 
within the area.
Emergency management
A revision of all relevant emergency management 
procedures and documents was also undertaken. 
This included the LCC Flood Evacuation Plan which 
outlines flood evacuation procedures and lists the 
organisations that are to be involved in an evacuation 
and their responsibilities (Willis et al 2008). The 
Tasmania Police have developed a section within the 
Flood Evacuation Plan which specifically addresses 
flooding in Invermay. The revision also incorporated 
a review of the Launceston Planning Scheme (1996) 
to accommodate flood-related building and planning 
restrictions within Launceston. The LCC has 
formulated a Flood Warning Plan, a Flood Response 
Plan and a Flood Levee Patrol Plan, all of which are to 
be used when it is likely that a flood event will occur. 
A General Management Plan and a Flood Recovery 
Plan were also revised in order to provide support 
during and in the aftermath of a flood event.
Levee reconstruction
The final section of the Agreed Measures outlined the 
agreement to rebuild more than 70 per cent of the 
existing levee system. This also involved the purchase 
and subsequent relocation of businesses along Lindsay 
Street in Invermay which was to take place over 
six years. The Agreed Measures included an annual 
$150,000 for levee maintenance and $250,000 from 
the State government for the dredging of silt from 
the Tamar River (Launceston City Council 2007a). 
The LCC has largely completed the acquisition of 
the Lindsay Street properties and is set to commence 
demolition work on Lindsay Street buildings in August 
2009. However, in June 2009 the cost of the flood 
mitigation project was reported to have blown out by 
$20 million due to the price of land acquisitions and 
escalating construction costs. Despite this setback and 
amidst surrounding uncertainty as to how this funding 
will be obtained, levee reconstruction project currently 
remains scheduled to be completed by December 2012 
(Scott 2009b).
Policy responses, levees and beyond
Once the funding from all tiers of government had 
been secured for levee reconstruction, the LCC began 
to implement the measures as agreed by the Flood 
Steering Committee. However, there has been a 
distinct focus on the reconstruction of the levees as 
the primary policy response to mitigate Launceston’s 
flood risk. This levee focus has been reflected through 
the media’s reporting, the way in which some members 
of the government have dealt with the issue and the 
way in which the issue has been interpreted by the 
community. The media has attached salience to the 
levee aspect of the flood issue as the most tangible 
feature of the Agreed Measures, with local papers 
broadcasting titles such as ‘Flood Levee Inaction Riles’, 
‘$10m Levee Boost’, ‘Action on Flood Levee Funding 
Needed Now’ and ‘Levee Action’ (Williams 2007c; 
Price 2007; Williams 2006; Lowe 2006, Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2007). Recent difficulties 
surrounding land acquisition to make way for the 
Lindsay Street levees and a $20m funding blowout 
have further intensified the perceived notion held by 
the media and community that the levees are the most 
important policy response to flood risk (Williams 
2008c; Scott 2009b). Members from all three tiers of 
government have also focused upon the levee system in 
order to attract political attention to the issue of flood 
risk and the need for funding. The LCC summarised 
the purpose of its quest for flood mitigation funding as 
a means to “repair the ageing flood levees” (Launceston 
City Council 2008b), while the belief that the funding 
should be “best spent on fixing the levee problem” 
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has been raised by members of Federal and State 
governments (Tasmanian Legislative Council 2007; 
Williams 2007d). These perceptions detract from the 
reality that effective flood mitigation must incorporate 
a multi-faceted approach. 
Fortunately, a multi-faceted approach has indeed 
been adopted in the Launceston context. Despite an 
overt focus on levee reconstruction by the media, 
community and some members of government, all 
policy measures outlined in the Agreed Measures 
continue to be implemented. It is important to note 
that the focus on levees in Launceston should by no 
means reflect the importance of the other Agreed 
Measures. It was this perception that led to the 
momentary push for the easing of planning restrictions, 
the endangerment of the flood mitigation funding and 
the potential for intensified flood risk as per Smith’s 
levee paradox. Alternatively, it should be emphasised 
that all policy measures are as important as one 
another. An effective levee system is of no use without 
an emergency evacuation plan. Similarly, there is no 
point in implementing short term strategies such as 
public education programs and revisions of emergency 
management documents without the adoption of 
long term planning and development restriction 
policies. Without the complete and unrestrained 
implementation of all the policies outlined in the 
Agreed Measures, the flood risk will not be adequately 
addressed. Further, a complete implementation of 
policies is necessary for policy makers and emergency 
management personnel to know what to do in the 
event of a flood.
Conclusion
The tri-partisan agreement between the Federal and 
State governments and the LCC has so far exhibited 
a potentially effective policy response to Launceston’s 
flood risk. However, it is vital that continuous 
support is offered from all levels of government where 
necessary. This is particularly relevant in light of the 
uncertainty as to who will supply the additional $20 
million necessary to complete the project. A broad 
range of agreed measures has been adopted, although 
this has not been reflected given the way in which 
political leadership and the media have allowed the 
levee issue to overwhelm the debate. Consequently, 
it is important to emphasise that a multi-faceted 
approach is critical in the effective mitigation of flood 
risk, as opposed to single strategy solutions or the 
emphasis on one measure at the expense of others. 
In the Launceston context, a heightened importance 
should be placed upon the maintenance of an effective 
community education strategy as highlighted by the 
Launceston Flood Research Initiative. 
Also, a genuine constraint on development in flood-
prone areas is essential so as to avoid the intensification 
of flood risk. Aside from these recommendations, this 
flood mitigation project can only be seen as a major 
step forward in natural disaster management for the 
area, reducing the risk of what could be a catastrophic 
scenario.
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